CO129-502-6 China- general situation 7-1-1927 - 3-3-1927 — Page 167

This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. January 1927.

SECRET.

761-B.

(Also Papers Nos. C.O.S.--61 and C.P. 12 (27).)

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

Copy No. 18

SITUATION IN CHINA, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SHANGHAI JANUARY 1927.

(Previous C.I.D. Papers Nos. 617-B, 677-B, 681-B, 722-B, 727-B, 750-B, 756-B, and 759-B.)

Report by the Chiefs of Staff.

1. With the authority of the Prime Minister we met as a matter of urgency to-day, January 17, 1927, at 12:30 P.M. to consider the military aspects of the defence of Shanghai.

2. At the outset we wish to remove any misapprehension as to our attitude in consequence of the following passage in Telegram No. 22 sent to Mr. Lampson on the 12th January-

"The question of the defence of Shanghai has been under consideration in conjunction with the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry, and, though no final conclusions have yet been reached, one point that is quite clear is that it is not intended that the British troops should, under any circumstances, come into conflict with Chinese National Army, and very clear instructions will have to be issued in order to avoid any such eventuality.

(NOTE. The telegram then proceeds to suggest dispositions with a view to avoiding any risk of contact between the British troops and the Chinese National Army.)

We were not consulted as a Committee in regard to this telegram, which, though sent just after the Cabinet meeting on the 12th January, appears to have been drafted some time before that meeting and obviously relates only to the original reinforcements for Shanghai for the maintenance of order against mob violence, and not to the larger situation raised by a possible decision to stand at Shanghai coûte que coûte.

3. On this latter point our attitude is made perfectly clear in our Report of the 11th January (C.I.D. Paper No. 756-B), where, in reference to the wish of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that we should proceed on the assumption that Shanghai is to be held in all circumstances, we stated that—

In view of the vastness of the British and international interests at stake we agree that this is the only point of view from which the subject can be approached."

4. From a military point of view we consider that Shanghai ought to be held. We note that this is also the view of the Naval Commander-in-chief, China Station (telegram No. 728 of the 12th January-see Appendix), and that the Consul-General, Shanghai, is reported to be in agreement and to hold the opinion that evacuation would prove impossible in practice.

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